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Conclusions
Summary of Findings
MAJOR TRENDS SINCE 1920
Striking changes have taken place in the commercial paper market
since 1920. In two respects the market is much smaller today: the
number of borrowers (only 849 in 1961) has diminished by over 90
per cent, and the number of dealers (10 in 1961) by about two-thirds.
On the other hand, a third and more meaningful criterion of size—the
volume of paper outstanding—has shown unusual growth, after having
experienced a drastic decline from 1920 to 1932. In 1961 outstanding
paper was more than four times as large as in 1920. As a result of these
changes, there are only about thirty-five borrowers per dealer today,
compared with four or five times as many four decades ago. However,
outstanding dealer paper per dealer, at $156.4 million in 1961, was more
than four times as high as in 1920; and outstanding dealer paper per
borrower ($4.5millionin 1961) was eighteen times higher than in 1920.
The rise in these ratios is almost as great after correction for price level
changes. Most of the rise occurred in the last decade.
No simple explanation could be found for the period of contraction,
1920-32. The declines of the early 1920's were associated with the severe
business cycle contraction of 1920-21; and those of the late 1920's may
have reflected the stock market boom, which not only occupied more
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of the energies of paper dealers but also led to the funding of working
capital by some borrowers. In addition, many long-time borrowers have
disappeared through mergers and failures. Some of the industries that
have traditionally made greatest use of commercial paper—textiles, food,
leather, and lumber—have not experienced rapid growth since 1920.
Since about 1932 changes in size have been closely related to other
changes in the commercial paper market—shifts in identity of borrowers
and lenders, and in the very character of the market. Finance companies,
which were distinctly minor paper borrowers in 1920, had become a
major force in the market by the mid-1930's; by 1960, they probably
accounted for 90 per cent of outstanding paper, the bulk of this being
sales finance paper. Similarly, nonfinancial corporations lent commercial
paper funds only rarely in 1920, yet today they hold over half of all
outstanding paper. Thus most of the rapid expansion in commercial
paper in recent years has been a by-product of the impressive growth
in consumer credit, which has furnished a strong demand for commercial
paper funds, and the tapping of corporate liquidity as a source of supply
of funds.
An important aspect of this shift in the sources of demand and
supply has been the transformation of commercial paper into a much
more attractive instrument than it was in 1920. Quality, as measured by
defaults and losses, has improved greatly, but the really significant
changes have been in the flexibility and liquidity of commercial paper.
Finance companies, being heavy and more or less continuous borrowers
throughout the year, have been willing to tailor maturities over a very
wide maturity range in accordance with lenders' preferences. In addition,
the large sales finance companies, which have found it advantageous to
borrow without the help of dealers, have adopted the practice of
"repurchasing" notes before maturity, thus compensating in some
measure for the absence of a secondary market in paper. Without these
modifications, it seems doubtful that nonfinancial corporations would
have become such eager suppliers of funds.
USE OF COMMERCIAL PAPER BY FINANCE COMPANIES
Since finance companies are the principal borrowers of commercial
paper funds, the role played by this type of debt in finance company
operations was investigated in some detail. It is clear from the data that
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there is no such thing as a typical finance company. In 1960,24.9 percent
of the total funds of a sample of sales finance companies came from
commercial paper. For a sample of personal loan companies, on the
other hand, commercial paper was only 7.1 .per cent of total funds.
Business finance companies, for which there are no comparable data,
probably occupied an intermediate position between these extremes.
Moreover, within the categories of finance companies the extent of
reliance on paper varies with firm size. Among sales finance companies
commercial paper was 26.1 per cent of the total funds of six "very large"
firms, while this statistic was 20.9 per cent for six "large" firms, 9.7 per
cent for thirteen "medium" firms, and only 6.1 per cent for seventeen
"small" firms. There is a similar relation among personal loan companies,
except that the largest firms in this part of the finance industry have
used paper only sparingly.
In all groups of finance companies (except small personal loan
companies), both by size and by type, commercial paper was a larger
fraction of total funds in 1960 than in 1948. Nevertheless, it appears that
the smaller sales finance companies do not use paper today as heavily
as they did in the 1930's. Along with the trend toward greater use of
paper, there has been a decline in the share of total funds derived from
bank loans. Among the largest sales finance companies, bank loans were
less than half as large as commercial paper in 1960, and they accounted
for only 11 per cent of total funds. In each of the other three groups of
sales finance companies, as well as in all four groups of personal loan
companies, bank debt still outranked commercial paper, but in every
case bank loans became a much smaller fraction of total funds and of
short-term funds during the postwar period. Banks remain important
to finance companies, of course, both as lenders and as providers of
"insurance," through lines of credit, against unanticipated declines in
outstanding commercial paper. All but a few very large sales finance
companies cover their commercial paper with open bank lines at all
times.
DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND THEBUSINESSCYCLE
The demand for commercial paper funds by finance companies (and
probably other borrowers as well)is determined primarily by the
amount of receivables that can be acquired profitably and by the relative
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cost of paper funds and bank funds. In measuring these costs, it is
necessary, of course, to consider not simply the explicit interest costs
but also the cost of dealer services and the costs of providing compen-
sating balances to line-granting banks. These cost differentials explain
both the postwar trend by finance companies toward increased use
of commercial paper and the particularly heavy use of paper by very
large sales finance companies. The differentials have tended to be much
larger recently than in the early postwar years, and borrowers have
therefore had a strong incentive to substitute commercial paper for
bank debt. Similarly, the largest sales finance companies have been able
to acquire commercial paper funds on better terms, relative to the cost
of bank funds, than have other borrowers.
The supply of funds appears to be quite elastic with respect to the
differential between paper yields and Treasury bill yields; i.e., given
any level of bill yields, a small increase in paper yields will result in a
substantial increase in the volume of funds supplied to the paper mar-
kets. Supply has increased sharply in recent years, as corporate treasurers
have become familiar with the advantages of commercial paper over
some other forms of liquidity, and as universities, foundations, churches,
state and local governments, individuals, and others have been drawn
into the market. It is because of this growing supply of funds that
commercial paper has been a relatively cheap source of funds in the
last several years.
Both demand and supply are cycle sensitive. The supply of funds
increases during recessions, as nonfinancial corporations, banks, and
other lenders acquire unwanted cash. Paper yields decline sharply on
these Qccasions, along with bill yields, and the differential between bank
rates and paper yields widens, increasing the quantity of paper funds
demanded. This effect may be somewhat stronger in the dealer paper
market than in the direct market because banks play a bigger role in
the former than in the latter. The demand for funds behaves quite
differently in the two segments of the market. Demand (though not
quantity demanded) appears to be quite stable over the cycle in the
dealer market, with the result that supply and cost changes dominate
the cyclical movements in dealer paper outstanding: dealer paper tends
to increase during recessions, when the cost of paper funds is low, and
to decrease during expansions, when the cost is high. In the direct
paper market, on the other hand, the demand for funds falls markedly
during recessions—so much so that outstanding paper falls, despite its
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relatively low cost at such times. In some degree, this difference in
cyclical behavior of dealer and direct paper also reflects a higher elas-
ticity of demand for paper funds in the dealer market.
Thus, recent cyclical movements in the commercial paper market
can be explained readily in terms of a few plausible hypotheses about
demand and supply conditions. Both demand and. supply are cyclically
volatile and elastic with respect to cost, but these elasticities and shifts
in schedules are not identical among all borrowers—hence the difference
in behavior over the business cycle.
Further Observations on the Significance of
Commercial Paper
COMMERCIAL PAPER AND THE BANKS
At the outset of this study I reviewed a number of respects in which
the commercial paper market is significant, even though it is a relatively
small part of the American financial system. The foregoing analysis
provides a good foundation for a closer look at one important aspect
of commercial paper—its impact on commercial banking in recent years.
The data reviewed in Chapters 4-6 leave no room for doubt that
commercial paper is an increasingly troublesome source of competition
for many banks. This competition shows up on both sides of bank
balance sheets.
On the asset side, finance companies, as well as other paper bor-
rowers, have shown a distinct tendency to trim back their bank debt in
favor of commercial paper funds, as long as sizable cost differentials
persist. Thus one of the more important sources of demand for bank
loans has been relatively sluggish in the last several years, and banks
are under strong pressure to devise some method of reviving this part
of their business. One approach the banks might take would be to make
credit available to finance companies on more attractive terms than at
present. Many finance companies are pressing for lower compensating
balance requirements as a step in this direction. Eventually, however,
the banks may find it advisable to create a lower-than-prime rate for
finance company loans; there is precedent for such a step in the case
of bank loans to securities dealers. Another approach the banks have
been taking is to meet the competition of the open market at its source,
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by competing more aggressively with finance companies in the markets
for personal loans and sales finance services. Insofar as bank penetration
of these markets has been at the expense of finance company growth,
the competition of commercial paper with bank loans to finance com-
panies has lost some of its sting.
The growth of commercial paper has influenced the liability side
of bank balance sheets by limiting deposit growth—and hence earning
asset growth—and by effecting a redistribution of deposits among banks.
These results have come about as corporate treasurers and others have
shifted from holdings of demand deposits to interest-earning forms of
liquidity, such as commercial paper.
The redistributive effects of commercial paper growth are clear.
The bulk of corporate cash is held on deposit in large metropolitan
banks. As these balances have been drawn down and converted into
commercial paper holdings, finance companies have used the funds to
acquire consumer instalment contracts in all parts of the country. A
portion of these deposits has ended up in banks in smaller communities.
The larger banks, of course, have been greatly concerned over this
deposit drain.
Less obvious is the fact that deposit growth has been adversely
affected for the entire banking system as well. It is true that when
demand deposits of large corporations are used to purchase commercial
paper they do not go out of existence. Broadly speaking, the volume of
deposits depends on Federal Reserve policy regarding the supply of bank
reserves. However, it is safe to assume that corporations do not reduce
their purchases of goods and services when they convert demand
deposits into commercial paper holdings; on the other hand, the new
owners of the former corporate cash balances can be expected to use
them to finance additional spending. The net result is likely to be an
increase in aggregate spending, and this implies an increase in the
velocity of circulation of money.' To the extent that growth in aggregate
spending is financed by rising velocity of money, the volume of demand
deposits need not—indeed, should not—expand. In this manner, there-
fore, the growth of commercial paper in recent years, along with
iHowever, itis doubtful that eornrnercial paper growth has made a major
contribution to the rising postwar trend in velocity. I have treated this topic in
The Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money, Occasional Paper 78, New York, NBER,
1962.
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Treasury bills and other liquid assets, has tended to limit growth of
bank deposits and earning assets.
Since early 1961 large banks have attempted to counter these
adverse competitive influences by offering negotiable time certificates
of deposit (CD's). Thus, as indicated earlier, banks have come full
circle by becoming borrowers in the open market, in addition to their
tiaditional function as open-market lenders. Through sales of CD's,
large banks are now offering an income-yielding money substitute that
will have the dual effects of checking the deposit drain to smaller banks
and of permitting total bank deposits and earning assets to grow along
with the trend toward higher velocity of money. The purchase of a CD
by a large corporation means a reduction in total demand deposits and
a corresponding rise in time deposits. This in itself, in all probability,
implies a rise in the amount of total spending per dollar of currency and
demand deposits, and hence a rise in velocity. Since reserve require-
ments behind time deposits are less than those behind demand deposits,
banks will be able to expand somewhat on the basis of a given supply
of reserves. Furthermore, as the economy grows, the Federal Reserve
authorities will have to augment bank reserves to permit an adequate
expansion of total liquidity in the economy.
It is clear that the CD can become a powerful tool for countering
the effects of open-market competition. Their rapid growth since 1961
certainly testifies to this.2 CD's may be expected to grow even more
rapidly if the Federal Reserve suspends Regulation Q,whichgoverns
maximum yields that member banks may offer on time and savings
deposits.3 Yet even if Regulation Qisretained in its present form, the
CD will continue to play a useful role. For it is precisely in easy-money
periods that banks feel the competition of the open market. On occasions
when open market yields rise to levels that make CD's unattractive to
investors, potential commercial paper borrowers will find the open
market less attractive and will tend to use their bank lines more fully.
2A Federal Reserve survey of 410 member banks found that CD's outstanding
at these banks amounted to $6.2 billionof December 5, 1962. See "Negotiable
Time Certificates of Deposit," Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1963.
3Since January 1, 1962, the ceilings have been 3.5 per cent on six-month
deposits and 4 per cent on deposits of 360daysor more.
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THEOUTLOOKFOR COMMERCIAL PAPER
The future of commercial paper will depend on a number of factors,
operating on both the demand and supply of funds, that cannot be
predicted with assurance. Of the two sets of factors, developments on
the supply side seem to be less certain and potentially more important
than those influencing demand.
The principal determinant of the supply of commercial paper funds
will be the volume of competing short-term debt instruments. The most
obvious competitor to commercial paper is the marketable short-term
debt of the federal government, which at the end of 1962 was nearly
$100 billion.4 This type of debt has grown tremendously in recent years
—by over $40 billion since 1955. In 1961 alone it grew by over $10
billion. Recent growth in commercial paper has also been impressive,
but one wonders what it might have been if short-term federal debt had
remained constant. Even more intriguing are the possible consequences
of a major funding of the federal debt. The average maturity of the
federal debt has tended to decline in the postwar period, and this trend
has been deplored by most commentators. Eventually, there will prob-
ably be a program to lengthen the maturity of the federal debt, in which
case commercial paper may become a considerably more important part
of the American financial system.
But short-term government securities are not the only competitor
of commercial paper. Several recent developments illustrate the strength
of competition in the money market. One is the issuance of short-term
notes by the Federal National Mortgage Association, beginning in
April 1960, and by the Savings Bank Trust Co., beginning in October
1962. The "Fanny Mae" notes are identical to finance company com-
mercial paper. Maturities may be designated by lenders within the
range of 30 to 270 days; the notes are unsecured and payable to bearer;
they are issued continuously and in denominations of $5,000 to
$1,000,000; and they are sold exclusively by a commercial paper dealer,
A. C. Becker & Company.5 The amount of these notes outstanding on
June 30, 1961 was $358.2 million.6 While these "Fanny Mae" notes are
4U.S. government marketable securities niaturing within one year, all holders,
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
C. Becker & Co., brochure on F.N.M.A. Short Term Discount Notes.
6Report and Financial Statement of the Secondary Market Operations, Federal
National Mortgage Association, June 30, 1961, p. 6. Note that the Federal Reserve
data on commercial paper outstanding do not include "Fanny Mae" notes.
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not likely to grow much beyond their present size, it would not be
surprising if other federal agencies began similar borrowing programs.
The Savings Bank Trust Company notes differ from commercial paper
in that they are secured, by real estate mortgages. These notes are sold
through a paper dealer, Salomon Brothers & Hutzler. While the amount
outstanding is not likely to become large, they nevertheless indicate the
willingness of money market participants to explore new paths.
A much more important competitor, as indicated above, is the
negotiable time certificate of deposit. CD's may well provide formidable
competition to commercial paper in years to come, especially if Regu-
lation Qisfurther liberalized or suspended altogether.
Aside from the possible impact of competitive types of debt, there
is the further question of how much the money market as a whole can
be expected to grow in coming decades. Much of the recent growth in
the money market has come from nonfinancial corporations, and one
may wonder whether this source can provide any substantial further
growth, other than the slow-expansion that should accompany a grow-
ing economy. Nonfinancial corporations have reduced their cash bal-
ances, relative to spending, to such an extent in the postwar period that
further large reductions will be quite difficult. If this is so, then it is all
the more clear that the future supply of commercial paper funds will
depend largely on the degree of competition from the federal govern-
ment and commercial banks.
Finally, we must consider the probable trend in the demand for
commercial paper funds. Much will depend on the rate of growth of
consumer credit, and of the finance-company share of the total. There
are indications that consumer credit has finally attained a mature stage
of development in the last few years. The ratio of repayments to dis-
personal income has leveled off since the end of 1957 at about
13 per cent. Furthermore, the growth rate in outstanding consumer
credit was less during the 1958-60 business cycle expansion than during
the preceding expansion, and it has been even less during the expansion
that began in February 1961. If this judgment is correct, growth in the
quantity of commercial paper funds demanded will depend largely on
the relative importance of finance companies in consumer credit markets
and on the degree to which they can continue to substitute paper funds
for bank credit. Competition from banks and credit unions has been
increasingly intense in recent years, and it seems unlikely that finance
companies will be able to do more than maintain their present share of
outstanding consumer credit. Moreover, the large sales finance corn-
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panies have already gone far along the path of substitution, although
considerable scope for substitution remains among the smaller sales
finance companies and among personal loan and business finance
companies of all sizes. However, the greatest potential source of demand
for commercial paper funds is among nonfinancial borrowers. If the
sizable differentials between bank interest rates and the cost of paper
funds continue, it is possible that these borrowers, along with finance
companies, will make greater use of commercial paper as a source of
funds in the future.
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